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Abstract
It is very important for the labor to have a national 
election mechanism of workers’ representatives in order 
to safeguard rights and interests of labor. The essential 
nature of the election of workers’ representatives is to 
aggregate the set of different individual preferences 
orders of every voter into a single sequence of group 
preference rationally and scientifically. It has been 
proved that lexicographic preferences ordering provides 
a better fit for voting representatives due to effects of 
irrational factors like emotion, desire, faith and some 
others. The paper, at first step, makes a mathematical 
description of worker voters’ behaviors based on the 
rule of lexicographic preferences ordering, performs 
an evaluation operations to instruct the operating 
mechanism of lexicographic ordering,  and then 
establishes associations among lexicographic ordering 
method, indifference curve of utility, majority vote 
counting method, Borda counting method and Condorcet 
counting method after a series of in-depth discussion of 
voters’ inter-behavior and their outcomes.
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INSTRUCTION
In recent  years,  various types of  enterprises in 
Chinahave been undergoing severe challenges in the 
reform storm with China’s economic development 
entering a new normal state, resulting in realities of 
increasingly intensified labor-capital contradictions. There 
wereapproximately 200 events of unlawful dismissal 
disputes triggering off workers’ collective struggles 
in which about one million workers were involvedin 
the first three quarters of 2015, as revealed in a rough 
investigation by an authorized mass media. If the labor, 
in a relatively disadvantageous position, wants to fight 
for more interests though a series of efficient collective 
bargaining lawfully, first of all, workers’ representatives 
on behalf of the actual will of labor’s group must 
be selected out. Therefore anelection mechanism 
of workers’ representatives reflecting the labor ’s 
group will be rationally needed urgently. Specifically 
speaking, the election mechanism incorporates two 
procedures. One is to generate m individual preference 
orders forcandidates through m voters’independent 
pollfollowing a certainvoting rule; the other is to form 
voters’ grouppreference order out of the set comprised 
by above-mentioned individual preference orders in light 
of some counting method. Aiming at facts of ubiquitous 
inefficiency observed after tracing the election of workers’ 
representatives in some famous corporations such as 
Hisense and Kelon, Microsoft (China), Nokia (Suzhou), 
the study focuses on the problem of worker voters’ 
individual preference ordering.
1.  LEXICOGRAPHIC PREFERENCE 
ORDERING OF WORKERS’ CANDIDATES
A s  f o r  w o r k e r  v o t e r s  c h o o s i n g  f r o m  a m o n g 
the candidates,  elect ion is  nothing but  a social 
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choice1 at the individual level with an essence of voter’s 
ranking the voted in light of his ownpreference. Two 
aspects should be deliberated when observing workers’ 
voting behavior.The first one is what are behavioral 
traitsof worker voters and how to realize self-consistent2 
between individualbehavior with hisaction goals? The 
second one is how the voters’traits affect the voting 
behaviors of their own?
1.1  The Ordering Behavior of Voters
An efficient social choice requires rational voting 
behaviors at least. On the basis of economic man 
hypothesis in economics, the hypothesis of rational 
man abstracted in social choice theories is: a) he can 
always make his own decision when confronting a 
series of options; b) he always orders according to his 
own preference so as to have every selected object to 
be superior, inferior, or indifferent to others; c) the 
preference orderis transitivity, that is, if he thinks of, 
then; d) he chooses the most preferred item as his final 
choice as usual; e) he would make the same decision in 
the confrontation of the same choice. In a brief, a rational 
man in social choice theories lays stress on ordering 
in accordance with individual preference, possesses 
implied a pre-set of continuously differentiable utility 
functionpartlyand his preference ordering is transitivity.
In reality, it is a certain non-classical individual 
preference ordering such as lexicographic ordering that 
can give a muchbetter explanation when discussing 
political choices (e.g. election of councilors), properties 
portfolio (assets distribution of the divorced) owing 
to some irrational elements such as emotion, desire, 
belief which forming an utility function which is non-
continuous, non-differentiable, or neither continuous nor 
differentiabl.3 The above-mentioned irrational elements 
may cause individual preference ordering to deviate 
from the rule of transitivity. Of course, the situation that 
ordering follows both of transitivity rule and lexicographic 
ordering rule may appear also if some irrational elements 
are involved. Therefore, many studies believe that maybe 
lexicographic ordering is fitting for individual ranking 
behaviors if regarding irrational elements as decisive 
bases.
Let’s suppose candidates have n kinds of attributes 
(written as x1, x2 ,..., xn), and the individual utility 
function (written as ����, ��, � ���, �� � ��  is non-
continuous function, then, we have
1 There are two kinds of social choice. One is to choose the 
commodities or combination of commodities by monetary approach, 
in which, the utility function of buyers is assumed as a continuous 
and differentiable one generally; the other is to make social choice 
by voting, in which, the utility function of voters can’t be described 
by a continuous and differentiable function in many cases. 
2 Self-consistent means someone can prove that he is at least 
not contradictory or wrong in accordance with his own logical 
deduction.
����� � �����,   � � �, � � �, � � �且� � � 
����, �� � �� � ����, ���, � � �, � � �,且� � �, 0 � � � ∞ 
���� � �, ��� � ����, �� � ��, � � �, � � �,且� � �, 0 � � � �, 0 � � � � 
The expression of aforesaidformulas is that the voter is 
always prefer the group with higher level whatever how 
desirable is, if he deem superior to For instance, if a lady 
had a tendency of lexicographic preference ordering in 
the case of choosing her spouse, to assume the ordering 
of candidates’ attributes having impacts on her choice 
is incometemper, then the one with the highest income 
level would be chosen no matter how nice others’ 
temper is, unless income levels of all of the selected 
were exactly the same. We can expressvoters’ preference 
ordering for attibutes by utility gradient formulas as 
below:
(0,0)? (0,1)? (0,2)? (0,3)? … …? (0, ∞)
? (1,0)? (1,1)? (1,2)? (1,3)? … …? (1, ∞)
? (2,0)? (2,1)? (2,2)? (2,3)? … …? (2, ∞)
? (3,0)? (3,1)? (3,2)? (3,3)? … …? (3, ∞)
? … …
1.2  Multiple Attributes of Candidates
Every candidates have multiple attributes, being related to 
workers’ collective struggle, which include more or less: a) 
whether the candidate has commitments being consistent 
with voters’ interest request or not (written as C); b)
whether the candidate supported by strong mass base or 
not(written as P); c) whether the candidate has a dominant 
voice or not (written as A); d) whether the candidate 
is active in collective struggle o f the labor or not 
(written as T); e) whether the candidate has satisfactory 
representative capacity or not (written as Y); f) whether 
the candidate has good teamwork ability or not (written as 
S) and so on.In actual, election of workers’ representatives 
is an action to choose and order among P candidates and 
combination of their attributes.
1 .3   A Eva luat ion  S imula t ion  on  Vot ing 
Mechanism of Workers’ Representatives
Suppose we have two voters, X and Y, and 5 candidates, 
a, b, c, d, e. Then assume the set of election criteria 
consisted by candidates’ attributesrecommended by 
election organization is (C, P, T, Y, A, S). Table 1 shows 
3 To take the derivative ofLagrangian function composed of a 
continuous and differentiable individual utility function and 
constraint condition of social choice can describe a curve of 
individual preference order and figure out optimal utility point. This 
kind of ordering is called classical preference ordering. 
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clearly candidates’ attributes are ranked as Y, C, A, P from 
top to bottom according to its relative importance. The 
five candidates, a, b, c, d, e is marked in every attribute 
item by X (score is decided to float between 0-10 points). 
Then X’s preference order is c? b? d? e? a following the 
steps ① and ② in Table 1.
Table 1
Voting Situation of X
A b c d e
Y 0 10 10 0 0
C 6.5 6.5 8.3 7.0 6.7
A 0.5 10 0.5 0.9 0.1
P 3.5 4.5 8.5 6.5 3.5
Similarly，we have Y’s preference order, d? c? b? a? 
e following the steps ① and ② in Table 2 in which there 
are only threegraded attributes item, C, Y,  P.
Table 2
Voting Situation of Y
a b c d e
C 5.6 8.4 8.4 8.4 3.9
Y 6.5 7.0 7.0 8.3 6.7
P 3.5 4.5 8.5 6.5 3.5
From that, the two voter, X and Y, determine his 
own preference order individually based on different 
lexicographic ranking and grading as for candidates of a, b, 
c, d, e.
Table 3
Subset of Individual Preference Ordering of X and Y
Voter Individual preference order (ranking from thefirst candidate to the fifth candidate)
X c b d e a
Y d c b a e
According to this method, we’ve got the set of 
individual preference orders of all the voters. The method 
of lexicographic ordering is fitting for voters’ behavior 
rules. Besides simplicity of manipulation, the significance 
is the voting method fully demonstrates multilevel and 
sequentiality of individual preference. It’s easy to bring 
about a self-consistent result if adopting the method of 
lexicographic ordering in the case of election of workers’ 
representatives.
2 .   A N A LY S E S  O N  O R D E R I N G 
BEHAVIORS OF MULTIPLE VOTERS
When voting, individual preference ordering may be 
manifest very often as two kinds, say lexicographic 
preference ordering or non-lexicographic preference 
ordering. We would like to discuss how voter ’s 
individual ordering has effects on the election of workers’ 
representatives when different voters interact on condition 
that they have different preference order.
2.1  The Situation of Voters’ Having the Same 
Lexicographic Preference Order
If voters exactly had the same lexicographic preference 
orderwith every other, subjective scoring of voter decides 
the candidates’ rank.
Case 1: If there were no material difference among 
voters’subjective scores, the situation would be similar to 
Unanimous Approval. As a result, a rational group voting 
sequence would generate after a single vote and counting 
which is the same as majority voting rule in essence.
Contrarily, majority poll is needed on too strict conditions 
to be applied in any cases in order to get aso-called 
rational group electing result. 
Case 2: If there is material difference among voters’ 
subjective scores as often, then a set comprising various 
individual preference orders will form.In this case, 
some scientific method of counting, for example, Borda 
counting method and Condorcet counting method, must 
be introduced so as to aggregate the above-mentioned set 
into a rationalunitary order.
2.2  The Situation of Voters’ Having Different 
Lexicographic Preference Order
Provided there were very different lexicographic 
preference orders among voters, an extreme situation 
should be deliberated firstly. If there formed pairs of 
completely-inverted sequence among voters in spite 
of their consensus scores in every attribute item for 
all candidates, Condorcet vote cycle would appear 
inevitab (see Table 4 and Table 5). And then it can be 
inferred that the more inverted among voters’ preference 
order, the higher the probability of the emergence of 
Condorcet vote cycle was. The inference extended to 
reality is that it is scarcely possible to form a rational 
group election order only adopting a simple poll rule or 
counting method, like majority voting rule, if there was 
a convincing show of disagree in opinion on appraisal 
of the importance candidates’ attributes and ranking 
them. In this circumstance, situation of One Vote Veto 
or being elected by one vote would take shape, having a 
very high system risk, if adopting the method of voting 
with singular voter as usualso as to avoid Condorcet 
vote cycle. In actual, the right improving directions are 
as follows. The first one is to have an internal talksat the 
first step to decide evaluation weightsof every kind of 
voterson candidates’ attributes (for instance, the more 
powerful the damage, the higher the weight), then to 
organize aelectionfollowing rule of weighted and rule 
of lexicographic ordering. The second one is to divide 
voters into two groups firstly and then to elect insub-
group with plain sequence and the one with the reverse 
sequence respectively.
①
①
②
②
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2.3  The Situation That Some Voters Have 
Lexicographic Preference Order and Others Have 
Non-Lexicographic Preference Order
We’d like to discuss an extreme situation as well when 
some voters rankedindividual preference according 
to lexicographic ordering rule and others did it with 
some non-lexicographic ordering rule. Assume the 
voters (written as B) with non-x1BG lexicographic 
preference order have a group of indifference curves 
as for a certain candidates’ attribute (written as I, II, 
III), which intersecting with the utility curve of voters 
with lexicographic preference order (written as A, and 
A prefer x1) at H(x1AC) and (x2AD) represent the initial 
score of candidates’ attribute, say ( x1, x2). AA’s appraisal 
ofAs Figure 1 shows, H is Paret optimality. This appears 
that the final utility of A increases from F(x1AC, x2AD) to 
F(x1AH, x2AD) because of B’s indifferent selection in group 
counting after individual vote ordering. 
Table 4
Rating Scale of Plain Sequence Group 
A B C D
X1 1 1 0.5 0.3
X2 0.5 1 0 0.5
X3 0 0 1 1
Table 5
Rating Scale of Reverse Sequence Group
A B C D
X3 0 0 1 1
X2 0.5 1 0 0.5
X1 1 1 0.5 0.3
在此处键入公式。
 
G
F D 
C H  x1 
x2  B 
A 
x1AC 
x2AD 
E
x2BF I
II  III
Figure 1
Analysis on Utility of A and B based on Edgeworth Box
In common, B’s ranking of attributes is random when 
the preference can be described by indifference curve. 
If there was an order on attributes recommended by 
election organization, the probability of B’s choosing 
the recommended order would be normal distribution.
The voting result is subject to manipulation of election 
organization because of the existence of B.
CONCLUSION
The social choice of workers’ representative requires 
individual preference orders are aggregated rationally 
into one group order according to a certain scientific 
voting and counting rule. Comparing with some classical 
preference ordering methods, method of lexicographic 
ordering is fitting for voters’ behaviors by far the most 
due to some irrational factors such as emotion, desire, 
belief and so on. We can get more complex interacting 
results when voters have different ordering tendency. The 
consequences are as follows:
(a) Majority voting rule commonly used would 
appear its rationality only on condition that all the 
voters had coherent lexicographic ordering tendency for 
candidates’ attributes.
(b) Borda counting method and Condorcet counting 
method should be introduced to get a rational aggregating 
group order if there appeared similar lexicographic orders 
among voters. 
(c) If there appeared reverseamong voters’ preference 
orders, appraisal weight should be taken into consideration 
firstly, or to divide the initial voting group into sub-group 
with plain sequence, sub-group with the reverse sequence 
and then to elect respectively.
(d) If voters’ ordering tendency was indifferent, the 
electing result is subject to manipulation of election 
organization.
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